[main] Update osv-vulnerability-alerts [SECURITY] (main)

[ospk8s-renovate]

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
github.com/google/cel-go	v0.23.2 → v0.30.0
go.opentelemetry.io/otel	v1.41.0 → v1.42.0
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace	v1.33.0 → v1.45.0
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace/otlptracegrpc	v1.33.0 → v1.45.0
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk	v1.34.0 → v1.45.0
golang.org/x/mod	v0.37.0 → v0.40.0
golang.org/x/text	v0.40.0 → v0.41.0
google.golang.org/grpc	v1.71.1 → v1.83.1

---

cel-go: JSON Private Fields Exposed via NativeTypes and ParseStructTag

GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g / GO-2026-6094

More information

Details

The function ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag("json")) does not honour the encoding/json skip directive json:"-". Fields tagged json:"-" are registered in the CEL type system under the literal name "-" and are readable from any user-submitted CEL expression via dyn(obj)["-"].

Additionally, newNativeTypes silently registers every nested struct reachable from the type passed to NativeTypes, including types from third-party dependencies the developer never examined.

Root cause

In fieldNameByTag, the helper used by ParseStructTag("json") to translate Go struct tags into CEL field names.

See at ext/native.go:146:

func fieldNameByTag(structTagToParse string) func(field reflect.StructField) string {
    return func(field reflect.StructField) string {
        tag, found := field.Tag.Lookup(structTagToParse)
        if found {
            splits := strings.Split(tag, ",")
            if len(splits) > 0 {
                // We make the assumption that the leftmost entry in the tag is the name.
                // This seems to be true for most tags that have the concept of a name/key, such as:
                // https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/xml#Marshal
                // https://pkg.go.dev/encoding/json#Marshal
                // https://pkg.go.dev/go.mongodb.org/mongo-driver/bson#hdr-Structs
                // https://pkg.go.dev/go.yaml.in/yaml/v3#Marshal
                name := splits[0]
                return name
            }
        }

        return field.Name
    }
}

For a field tagged json:"-", this code splits the tag into []string{"-"} and returns "-" as the CEL field name. It never checks whether "-" is the JSON skip sentinel.

This contradicts the encoding/json rule that the source comment explicitly points readers to:

As a special case, if the field tag is "-", the field is always omitted. Note
that a field with name "-" can still be generated using the tag "-,".

The public option also documents JSON-style parsing as the intended behavior.
See at ext/native.go:190:

// ParseStructTag configures the struct tag to parse. The 0th item in the tag is used as the name of the CEL field.
// For example:
// If the tag to parse is "cel" and the struct field has tag cel:"foo", the CEL struct field will be "foo".
// If the tag to parse is "json" and the struct field has tag json:"foo,omitempty", the CEL struct field will be "foo".
func ParseStructTag(tag string) NativeTypesOption {
    return func(ntp *nativeTypeOptions) error {
        ntp.fieldNameHandler = fieldNameByTag(tag)
        return nil
    }
}

A developer using ParseStructTag("json") is therefore led to expect encoding/json field-name semantics. Instead, json:"-" is treated as a real field name.

The bad name is accepted during native type construction. newNativeType checks for duplicate field names, but it does not reject or skip empty names or skip sentinels.

See at ext/native.go:663:

if fieldNameHandler != nil {
    fieldNames := make(map[string]struct{})

    for idx := 0; idx < refType.NumField(); idx++ {
        field := refType.Field(idx)
        fieldName := toFieldName(fieldNameHandler, field)

        if _, found := fieldNames[fieldName]; found {
            return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid field name `%s` in struct `%s`: %w", fieldName, refType.Name(), errDuplicatedFieldName)
        } else {
            fieldNames[fieldName] = struct{}{}
        }
    }
}

Once accepted, the field becomes part of CEL's view of the type. Field enumeration reports it as a normal field name.

See at ext/native.go:286:

func (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldNames(typeName string) ([]string, bool) {
    if t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]; found {
        fieldCount := t.refType.NumField()
        fields := make([]string, fieldCount)
        for i := 0; i < fieldCount; i++ {
            fields[i] = toFieldName(tp.options.fieldNameHandler, t.refType.Field(i))
        }
        return fields, true
    }
    if celTypeFields, found := tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName); found {
        return celTypeFields, true
    }
    return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldNames(typeName)
}

Field lookup also treats the name as valid and returns the underlying Go field value.

See at ext/native.go:303:

func (tp *nativeTypeProvider) FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName string) (*types.FieldType, bool) {
    t, found := tp.nativeTypes[typeName]
    if !found {
        return tp.baseProvider.FindStructFieldType(typeName, fieldName)
    }
    refField, isDefined := t.hasField(fieldName)
    if !found || !isDefined {
        return nil, false
    }

    return &types.FieldType{
        IsSet: func(obj any) bool {
            refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))
            refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)
            return !refField.IsZero()
        },
        GetFrom: func(obj any) (any, error) {
            refVal := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(obj))
            refField := refVal.FieldByName(refField.Name)
            return getFieldValue(refField), nil
        },
    }, true
}

At runtime, native objects advertise index access.
See at ext/native.go:37:

var (
    nativeObjTraitMask = traits.FieldTesterType | traits.IndexerType
)

Because traits.IndexerType is present, a user expression can bypass ordinary field syntax and read the registered "-" field with bracket access:

dyn(req.auth)["-"]

The same mistaken name is also used when converting native objects to JSON-like CEL values. ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) iterates all Go struct fields, computes the CEL field name, and inserts it into the output map without applying the JSON skip rule.

See at ext/native.go:501:

case jsonStructType:
    refVal := reflect.Indirect(o.refValue)
    refType := refVal.Type()
    fields := make(map[string]*structpb.Value, refVal.NumField())
    for i := 0; i < refVal.NumField(); i++ {
        fieldType := refType.Field(i)
        fieldValue := refVal.Field(i)
        if !fieldValue.IsValid() || fieldValue.IsZero() {
            continue
        }
        fieldName := toFieldName(o.valType.fieldNameHandler, fieldType)
        fieldCELVal := o.NativeToValue(fieldValue.Interface())
        fieldJSONVal, err := fieldCELVal.ConvertToNative(jsonValueType)
        if err != nil {
            return nil, err
        }
        fields[fieldName] = fieldJSONVal.(*structpb.Value)
    }
    return &structpb.Struct{Fields: fields}, nil

This means a json:"-" secret is exposed in two ways: it can be read directly through CEL indexing as dyn(obj)["-"], and it can appear under the key "-" in JSON struct conversion output.

The blast radius is widened by newNativeTypes, which registers not only the type explicitly passed to NativeTypes, but also every nested struct reachable from its fields.

See at ext/native.go:609:

func newNativeTypes(fieldNameHandler NativeTypesFieldNameHandler, rawType reflect.Type) ([]*nativeType, error) {
    nt, err := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, rawType)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    result := []*nativeType{nt}

    var iterateStructMembers func(reflect.Type)
    iterateStructMembers = func(t reflect.Type) {
        if k := t.Kind(); k == reflect.Pointer || k == reflect.Slice || k == reflect.Array || k == reflect.Map {
            iterateStructMembers(t.Elem())
            return
        }
        if t.Kind() != reflect.Struct {
            return
        }

        nt, ntErr := newNativeType(fieldNameHandler, t)
        if ntErr != nil {
            err = ntErr
            return
        }
        result = append(result, nt)

        for idx := 0; idx < t.NumField(); idx++ {
            iterateStructMembers(t.Field(idx).Type)
        }
    }
    iterateStructMembers(rawType)

    return result, err
}

As a result, a developer can register one apparently safe request type while a nested dependency type is silently registered too. If that nested type contains a json:"-" secret, CEL still receives a readable field named "-" even though the developer never registered or audited that nested type directly.

Reproduction

package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "reflect"

    "github.com/google/cel-go/cel"
    "github.com/google/cel-go/ext"
)

// Simulates a library type; developer never registers this directly.
type AuthCtx struct {
    UserID string `json:"userId"`
    Secret string `json:"-"` // server-internal; never appears in JSON output
}

// Developer registers only this type.
type Req struct{ Auth AuthCtx `json:"auth"` }

func main() {
    env, _ := cel.NewEnv(
        // Only Req is passed; AuthCtx is registered silently by newNativeTypes.
        ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(Req{}), ext.ParseStructTag("json")),
        cel.Variable("req", cel.ObjectType("main.Req")),
    )
    ast, _ := env.Compile(`dyn(req.auth)["-"]`)
    prg, _ := env.Program(ast)
    out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{
        "req": Req{Auth: AuthCtx{UserID: "alice", Secret: "sk-live-s3cr3t"}},
    })
    fmt.Println(out) // sk-live-s3cr3t
}

Expected: expression compile error or empty result; json:"-" field should not be
accessible.
Actual: sk-live-s3cr3t; the server-injected secret is returned verbatim.

The same field is also included under key "-" in ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)
output, and appears in FindStructFieldNames enumeration.

path 1. CEL indexing

Tested against the released module github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1
(latest stable release as of 2026-05-12), using the go.mod entry:

require github.com/google/cel-go v0.28.1

Running the PoC above (go run main.go) produces:

sk-live-s3cr3t

The secret value is returned verbatim, with no error at compile time or at runtime.

Path 2. ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)

When the nativeObj for the AuthCtx value is converted to a Protobuf Struct
(the representation used whenever CEL output is serialised to JSON), the
json:"-" field appears in the output map under the key "-".

package main

import (
    "encoding/json"
    "fmt"
    "reflect"

    "github.com/google/cel-go/cel"
    "github.com/google/cel-go/ext"

    structpb "google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/structpb"
)

type AuthCtxConv struct {
    UserID string `json:"userId"`
    Secret string `json:"-"` // should never appear in JSON output
}

type ReqConv struct{ Auth AuthCtxConv `json:"auth"` }

func main() {
    env, _ := cel.NewEnv(
        ext.NativeTypes(reflect.TypeOf(ReqConv{}), ext.ParseStructTag("json")),
        cel.Variable("req", cel.ObjectType("main.ReqConv")),
    )

    ast, _ := env.Compile(`req.auth`)
    prg, _ := env.Program(ast)
    out, _, _ := prg.Eval(map[string]any{
        "req": ReqConv{Auth: AuthCtxConv{UserID: "alice", Secret: "sk-live-s3cr3t"}},
    })

    jsonStructType := reflect.TypeOf(&structpb.Struct{})
    raw, _ := out.ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)

    st := raw.(*structpb.Struct)
    b, _ := json.MarshalIndent(st.AsMap(), "", "  ")
    fmt.Printf("ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:\n%s\n", b)
    fmt.Printf("\nDirect field access via \"-\" key present: %v\n", st.Fields["-"] != nil)
    if v, ok := st.Fields["-"]; ok {
        fmt.Printf("Value: %s\n", v.GetStringValue())
    }
}

Running the PoC above produces:

ConvertToNative(jsonStructType) output:
{
  "-": "sk-live-s3cr3t",
  "userId": "alice"
}

Direct field access via "-" key present: true
Value: sk-live-s3cr3t

The "-" key is present in the serialised Protobuf struct alongside userId.
Any system that converts a CEL evaluation result to JSON (e.g. via structpb.Struct) will include the secret in the output, regardless of whether the dyn()["-"] indexing path is used.

Impact

Any user who can submit CEL expressions to an application that uses ext.NativeTypes(ParseStructTag("json")) can read struct fields that the developer explicitly marked json:"-" to keep out of serialised output. By writing dyn(obj)["-"], the attacker retrieves the raw Go field value, typically a secret, internal token, or private identifier, with no compile-time or runtime error. Because newNativeTypes silently registers every nested struct reachable from the root type, the attacker may also reach secrets in dependency types the developer never intended to expose to CEL.

Remediation

Do not treat json:"-" as a CEL field named "-". Model it as an explicit skipped field, not as an empty string field name.

Update the struct-tag parsing path so exact json:"-" returns “skip this field”, while json:"-," continues to mean the literal field name "-", matching encoding/json semantics.

Apply that skip decision consistently anywhere native fields are exposed or resolved:

• duplicate-name validation in newNativeType
• field enumeration in FindStructFieldNames
• field type lookup in FindStructFieldType
• runtime lookup in fieldByName / hasField
• object construction in NewValue
• JSON conversion in ConvertToNative(jsonStructType)

Apply the same omit handling for xml:"-", yaml:"-", and bson:"-" where ParseStructTag is used.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/cel-expr/cel-go/security/advisories/GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g
• https://github.com/cel-expr/cel-go

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

JSON private fields exposed via NativeTypes and ParseStructTag in github.com/google/cel-go

GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g / GO-2026-6094

More information

Details

JSON private fields exposed via NativeTypes and ParseStructTag in github.com/google/cel-go

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/cel-expr/cel-go/security/advisories/GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Opentelemetry-go's baggage parsing no longer caps raw header length in go.opentelemetry.io/otel

CVE-2026-41178 / GHSA-5wrp-cwcj-q835 / GO-2026-5158

More information

Details

Opentelemetry-go's baggage parsing no longer caps raw header length in go.opentelemetry.io/otel

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-5wrp-cwcj-q835
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/7880

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

OpenTelemetry-Go: Exporter config logging may leak endpoint URLs in info logs

CVE-2026-81870 / GHSA-8wmf-6v46-5gfg / GO-2026-6505

More information

Details

Summary

OpenTelemetry Go versions 1.5.0 through 1.44.0 can include trace exporter endpoint configuration in an internal diagnostic log emitted when an SDK TracerProvider is created. The default OpenTelemetry logger does not emit this event. Exposure requires an application to install a logger that enables OpenTelemetry's internal Info-level diagnostics and for someone other than the intended audience to have access to those logs.

The logged configuration can disclose the address of the trace collector and whether the OTLP/HTTP connection is configured as insecure. The Zipkin exporter logs its complete collector URL, so credentials in URL userinfo or tokens in the query string are also disclosed if an application embeds them there. OTLP authentication headers, TLS key material, and exported span data are not included in this log.

Exporter MarshalLog implementations that caused this configuration to be included in internal logs were introduced by a1fff3c.

Details

When sdk/trace.NewTracerProvider constructs a provider, it records a TracerProvider created internal Info event containing the provider configuration. In affected versions, the configuration's MarshalLog methods recursively include:

1. the provider's span processors;
2. each processor's span exporter; and
3. for the OTLP trace exporter, its client configuration.

This causes the following values to be present in the event:

• OTLP trace gRPC: the configured endpoint;
• OTLP trace HTTP: the configured endpoint and the Insecure flag; and
• Zipkin: the complete collector URL.

OpenTelemetry Go does not emit this event with its default logger, which only emits errors. An application must explicitly configure a sufficiently verbose logger with otel.SetLogger. The required logr verbosity is version-dependent:

• versions 1.5.0 through 1.14.x use V(1) for this Info event; and
• versions 1.15.0 through 1.44.0 use V(4).

OTLP header configuration is not part of the marshaled object, so credentials supplied with WithHeaders or the corresponding environment variables are not exposed. The documented OTLP WithEndpoint input is a collector address rather than a credential-bearing URL. The higher-risk case is therefore the Zipkin collector URL, which is retained and logged in full, or an application passing sensitive data in an OTLP endpoint outside the documented format.

Proof of concept

The following program demonstrates the behavior with OpenTelemetry Go 1.44.0. It deliberately places credentials and a token in the Zipkin collector URL and enables internal Info logging:

package main

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"fmt"

	"github.com/go-logr/logr/funcr"
	"go.opentelemetry.io/otel"
	"go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/zipkin"
	sdktrace "go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk/trace"
)

func main() {
	var logs bytes.Buffer
	otel.SetLogger(funcr.New(func(_, args string) {
		_, _ = logs.WriteString(args)
	}, funcr.Options{Verbosity: 4}))

	exporter, err := zipkin.New(
		"http://user:pass@zipkin.internal:9411/api/v2/spans?token=secret",
	)
	if err != nil {
		panic(err)
	}

	tp := sdktrace.NewTracerProvider(sdktrace.WithBatcher(exporter))
	_ = tp.Shutdown(context.Background())

	fmt.Println(logs.String())
}

The TracerProvider created event contains:

http://user:pass@zipkin.internal:9411/api/v2/spans?token=secret

For versions before 1.15.0, set funcr.Options{Verbosity: 1} instead.

Impact

This is a conditional disclosure through application logs. Affected applications must enable verbose OpenTelemetry internal diagnostics and configure a trace exporter containing information they do not intend to expose to readers of those logs. In that configuration, a person or system with log access can learn the trace collector address and internal network topology. If credentials or tokens are embedded directly in a Zipkin collector URL, those values can also be recovered from the logs.

There is no exposure with the default OpenTelemetry logger, and the vulnerable log is generated from local application configuration rather than remotely supplied span data. OTLP authentication headers, certificate or private-key contents, and telemetry payloads are not logged by this path.

Remediation

Upgrade the affected OpenTelemetry Go modules to version 1.45.0 or later. The fix in 3a1412d stops recursively marshaling exporter and client configuration and records their types instead.

If an immediate upgrade is not possible:

• keep OpenTelemetry internal logging below the Info verbosity described above;
• do not embed credentials or tokens in exporter endpoint URLs; use authentication headers or another supported credential mechanism; and
• restrict access to existing logs and rotate any credentials that may already have been recorded.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 2.0 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-8wmf-6v46-5gfg
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81870
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/8438
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/3a1412d2b3bc4e4231fbeac2ed42117ae541bb38
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/exporters/zipkin/v1.45.0
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/sdk/v1.45.0

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

OpenTelemetry-Go: Exporter config logging may leak endpoint URLs in info logs in go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace

CVE-2026-81870 / GHSA-8wmf-6v46-5gfg / GO-2026-6505

More information

Details

OpenTelemetry-Go: Exporter config logging may leak endpoint URLs in info logs in go.opentelemetry.io/otel/exporters/otlp/otlptrace

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-8wmf-6v46-5gfg
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81870
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/3a1412d2b3bc4e4231fbeac2ed42117ae541bb38
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/pull/8438
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/exporters/zipkin/v1.45.0
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/sdk/v1.45.0

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

OpenTelemetry Go SDK Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via PATH Hijacking

CVE-2026-24051 / GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq / GO-2026-4394

More information

Details

Impact

The OpenTelemetry Go SDK in version v1.20.0-1.39.0 is vulnerable to Path Hijacking (Untrusted Search Paths) on macOS/Darwin systems. The resource detection code in sdk/resource/host_id.go executes the ioreg system command using a search path. An attacker with the ability to locally modify the PATH environment variable can achieve Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) within the context of the application.

Patches

This has been patched in d45961b, which was released with v1.40.0.

References

• CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.0 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24051
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/d45961bcda453fcbdb6469c22d6e88a1f9970a53
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go
• https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4394

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

OpenTelemetry Go SDK Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via PATH Hijacking in go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk

CVE-2026-24051 / GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq / GO-2026-4394

More information

Details

OpenTelemetry Go SDK Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via PATH Hijacking in go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/commit/d45961bcda453fcbdb6469c22d6e88a1f9970a53

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

opentelemetry-go: BSD kenv command not using absolute path enables PATH hijacking

CVE-2026-39883 / GHSA-hfvc-g4fc-pqhx / GO-2026-5426

More information

Details

Summary

The fix for GHSA-9h8m-3fm2-qjrq (CVE-2026-24051) changed the Darwin ioreg command to use an absolute path but left the BSD kenv command using a bare name, allowing the same PATH hijacking attack on BSD and Solaris platforms.

Root Cause

sdk/resource/host_id.go line 42:

if result, err := r.execCommand("kenv", "-q", "smbios.system.uuid"); err == nil {

Compare with the fixed Darwin path at line 58:

result, err := r.execCommand("/usr/sbin/ioreg", "-rd1", "-c", "IOPlatformExpertDevice")

The execCommand helper at sdk/resource/host_id_exec.go uses exec.Command(name, arg...) which searches $PATH when the command name contains no path separator.

Affected platforms (per build tag in host_id_bsd.go:4): DragonFly BSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris.

The kenv path is reached when /etc/hostid does not exist (line 38-40), which is common on FreeBSD systems.

Attack

1. Attacker has local access to a system running a Go application that imports go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk
2. Attacker places a malicious kenv binary earlier in $PATH
3. Application initializes OpenTelemetry resource detection at startup
4. hostIDReaderBSD.read() calls exec.Command("kenv", ...) which resolves to the malicious binary
5. Arbitrary code executes in the context of the application

Same attack vector and impact as CVE-2026-24051.

Suggested Fix

Use the absolute path:

if result, err := r.execCommand("/bin/kenv", "-q", "smbios.system.uuid"); err == nil {

On FreeBSD, kenv is located at /bin/kenv.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.3 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-hfvc-g4fc-pqhx
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39883
• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go
• http://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/v1.43.0

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Opentelemetry-go: BSD kenv command not using absolute path enables PATH hijacking in go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk

CVE-2026-39883 / GHSA-hfvc-g4fc-pqhx / GO-2026-5426

More information

Details

Opentelemetry-go: BSD kenv command not using absolute path enables PATH hijacking in go.opentelemetry.io/otel/sdk

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-hfvc-g4fc-pqhx
• http://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/releases/tag/v1.43.0

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Fix transparency log tile verification bypass in golang.org/x/mod/sumdb/tlog

BIT-golang-2026-56865 / CVE-2026-56865 / GO-2026-6179

More information

Details

A malicious GOPROXY was previously capable of forging up to two sumdb tiles that allow for a requested module to bypass the GOSUMDB check and persist attacker-controlled module content to a local Go module cache.

This attack allows for a malicious GOPROXY to serve malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log.

All tiles are now correctly verified against their parents.

In order to determine if you have been affected:

rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ && go mod tidy

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://go.dev/issue/80744
• https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI
• https://go.dev/cl/814960
• https://go.dev/cl/815020

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Ignore unrelated, unauthenticated hashes in Lookup in golang.org/x/mod/sumdb

BIT-golang-2026-56864 / CVE-2026-56864 / GO-2026-6180

More information

Details

A malicious GOSUMDB was capable of serving arbitrary module content not contained within the transparency log.

This attack allows for a coordinating GOPROXY and GOSUMDB to serve a client malicious module content that cannot be detected by evaluating the transparency log.

In order to determine if you have been affected:

rm -r go.sum go.work.sum vendor/ && go mod tidy

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://go.dev/issue/80745
• https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/94pEornpRlI
• https://go.dev/cl/815000
• https://go.dev/cl/815020

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Panic parsing crafted input in x/text/secure/precis in golang.org/x/text

CVE-2026-56851 / GO-2026-6629

More information

Details

The Nickname profile can panic with an out-of-bounds slice error when transforming crafted input into a short destination buffer.

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://go.dev/cl/793360
• https://go.dev/issue/80112

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

gRPC-Go has an authorization bypass via missing leading slash in :path

CVE-2026-33186 / GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3 / GO-2026-4762

More information

Details

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

It is an Authorization Bypass resulting from Improper Input Validation of the HTTP/2 :path pseudo-header.

The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the :path omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., Service/Method instead of /Service/Method). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official grpc/authz package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with /) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present.

Who is impacted?
This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:

1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in google.golang.org/grpc/authz or custom interceptors relying on info.FullMethod or grpc.Method(ctx).
2. Their security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule).

The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed :path headers directly to the gRPC server.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a :path that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a codes.Unimplemented error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.

Users should upgrade to the following versions (or newer):

• v1.79.3
• The latest master branch.

It is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization (especially grpc/authz) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a tagged release.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:

1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)

Add an "outermost" interceptor to your server that validates the path before any other authorization logic runs:

func pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
    if info.FullMethod == "" || info.FullMethod[0] != '/' {
        return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "malformed method name")
    }   
    return handler(ctx, req)
}

// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain
s := grpc.NewServer(
    grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),
)

2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization

If your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or normalize requests where the :path header does not start with a leading slash.

3. Policy Hardening

Switch to a "default deny" posture in your authorization policies (explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 9.1 / 10 (Critical)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33186
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Authorization bypass in gRPC-Go via missing leading slash in :path in google.golang.org/grpc

CVE-2026-33186 / GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3 / GO-2026-4762

More information

Details

Authorization bypass in gRPC-Go via missing leading slash in :path in google.golang.org/grpc

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC and HTTP/2 Vulnerabilities

GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf / GO-2026-6061

More information

Details

Multiple security vulnerabilities have been identified and addressed in grpc-go affecting the xDS RBAC authorization engine (internal/xds/rbac) and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation (internal/transport). These vulnerabilities could result in:

• Authorization Bypass (Fail-Open) when translating xDS RBAC policies containing Metadata or RequestedServerName fields.
• Denial of Service (High CPU Consumption) due to an HTTP/2 Rapid Reset mitigation bypass during client-initiated stream resets.
• Denial of Service (Server Panic) when parsing crafted xDS RBAC policies containing NOT rules around unsupported fields.

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?

xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass via Metadata & RequestedServerName matchers

• Affected Component: xDS RBAC
• Impact: When building policy matchers for gRPC RBAC from xDS configurations, unsupported permission and principal rules (specifically Metadata and RequestedServerName) were silently ignored and treated as no-ops.
  • If an authorization policy relied purely on these matchers for access control, treating those rules as no-ops effectively removed the restrictions.
• If these unsupported rules were nested inside logical NOT rules (Permission_NotRule / Principal_NotId) or multi-condition OR/AND rules, silently dropping them changed the boolean logic flow of the authorization engine.

As a result, policy evaluation decisions could fail open, allowing unauthorized clients to access protected gRPC services or resources.

HTTP/2 Rapid Reset Mitigation Bypass / Denial of Service via Stream Aborts

• Affected Component: HTTP/2 transport
• Impact: Earlier mitigations in grpc-go for HTTP/2 Rapid Reset only applied threshold checks to items that directly resulted in control frames being written back to the wire, such as SETTINGS ACKs or server-initiated RST_STREAMs.

When a client initiated a rapid flood of stream creation (HEADERS) immediately followed by stream termination RST_STREAM, items queued up in the control buffer without counting against the transport response frame threshold. An attacker can repeatedly trigger this flood sequence to bypass reader blocking, resulting in high CPU usage, and Denial of Service (DoS).

Denial of Service (Panic) in xDS RBAC Engine via Unsupported Fields inside NOT Rules

• Affected Component: xDS RBAC
• Impact: The xDS RBAC policy translators recursively generate matchers for nested rules. When a NOT rule wrapped an unsupported or unhandled field (such as SourcedMetadata), the recursive step returned an empty matcher. This could result in a runtime panic when the RBAC engine attempts to authorize an incoming request.

An attacker or misconfigured/malicious xDS management server delivering an LDS/RDS update containing a NOT rule around an unhandled field causes the gRPC server process to crash immediately (CWE-248 / Denial of Service).

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

All three issues have been fixed in master and will be released in 1.82.1 shortly.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

If upgrading grpc-go immediately is not possible, apply the following workarounds based on your deployment architecture:

• For xDS RBAC Vulnerabilities & Panics: Ensure that upstream xDS management servers do not push RBAC policies containing Metadata, RequestedServerName, or NOT rules wrapping unsupported fields (such as SourcedMetadata) to grpc-go servers.
• For HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DOS: Configure upstream reverse proxies or load balancers (such as Envoy) with strict HTTP/2 max_concurrent_streams limits and active rate limiting on RST_STREAM frequency per connection.

Severity

Vulnerability	Qualitative Severity	Approximate CVSS v3.1 Score	Primary Impact
xDS RBAC Authorization Bypass	High	8.2	Unauthorized Access / Fail-Open
HTTP/2 Rapid Reset DOS Bypass	High	7.5	High CPU Consumption / Denial of Service
xDS RBAC Engine Server Panic	Medium	5.9	Process Crash / Denial of Service

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9236
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/4ea465d4ab98013f72a142fe0fc89c19770b2935
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases/tag/v1.82.1

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Vulnerabilities in the xDS RBAC authorization engine and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation in google.golang.org/grpc

GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf / GO-2026-6061

More information

Details

Vulnerabilities in the xDS RBAC authorization engine and the HTTP/2 transport server implementation in google.golang.org/grpc

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-hrxh-6v49-42gf
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/4ea465d4ab98013f72a142fe0fc89c19770b2935
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9236
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases/tag/v1.82.1

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

gRPC-Go xDS servers: Denial of Service (DoS) via crash due to missing :authority and Host headers

CVE-2026-84445 / GHSA-2v4p-qf9q-27wj / GO-2026-6443

More information

Details

A vulnerability exists in gRPC-Go servers configured with xds.NewGRPCServer() where a crafted request missing both :authority and Host headers can cause a server panic, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS).

Servers built with xds.NewGRPCServer install an xDS routing interceptor on every RPC. This interceptor looks up the request’s :authority header to pick a virtual host. The HTTP/2 server transport previously accepted requests that had neither :authority nor Host. When this happened, the xDS routing interceptor attempted to access the first element of an empty slice of authorities, leading to an index out of bounds panic. Since the per-RPC goroutine does not recover from panics, the entire server process would terminate.

This panic occurs in the interceptor pipeline, meaning the transport credentials handshake (TLS, mTLS, or ALTS) and HTTP/2 connection establishment must complete successfully before the crafted request can reach this logic.

• Insecure/Standard TLS: If the server permits insecure (plaintext) connections or standard credentials (where client certs are not checked), any unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger the crash.
• mTLS / ALTS: If strict transport-level authentication is enforced at the network edge or transport layer (e.g., requiring a valid client certificate), the attacker must possess valid transport credentials to initiate the stream and trigger the panic.

Impact

An attacker can cause a complete outage of the gRPC server by sending a request missing both :authority and Host headers, provided they can successfully establish a transport connection.

Patches

The issue has been addressed in master (and backported to 1.84.0, 1.83.2 and 1.82.2). The fix updates the HTTP/2 transport layer to reject requests missing both :authority and Host headers early, maintaining consistency with and other gRPC language implementations.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

References

• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-2v4p-qf9q-27wj
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84445
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/issues/9354
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9365
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9366
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9367
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/3822494d8ea03b992c089fd2a195f041762fffb7
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/8668b69c167df908b6b3666dcbf40992b9e932a4
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/commit/93e31b48545e2a8aaeb6e06b47fb249f94e6297f
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases/tag/v1.82.2
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases/tag/v1.83.2

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Server panic via missing authority or Host headers in google.golang.org/grpc

CVE-2026-84445 / GHSA-2v4p-qf9q-27wj / GO-2026-6443

More information

Details

In google.golang.org/grpc, servers configured with xDS routing can panic when processing requests that lack both :authority and Host headers. The HTTP/2 transport layer accepted requests missing these headers, and the xDS server routing interceptor attempted to index the empty authority slice, causing an unhandled panic and terminating the server.

Severity

Unknown

References

• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-2v4p-qf9q-27wj
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/issues/9354
• https://github.com/grpc/grpc-go/pull/9365

This data is provided by OSV and the Go Vulnerability Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

gRPC-Go: xDS RBAC HTTP Filter bypass via mixed-case Header Matching and gRFC A41 validation evasion

CVE-2026-84303 / GHSA-qc2q-p7wx-3px3 / GO-2026-6441

More information

Details

Summary

A vulnerability in the xDS RBAC HTTP filter implementation in grpc-go allows remote attackers to bypass authorization policies (specifically DENY rules) by using mixed-case or canonical-case header matchers (e.g., X-Role instead of x-role). Additionally, the safety guards introduced by gRFC A41 to block grpc- prefixed headers can be evaded via variations in casing (e.g., Grpc-Status).

Impact

When an operator defines an RBAC policy referencing headers containing uppercase letters (e.g. X-Role), grpc-go fails to match incoming metadata keys because they are unconditionally lowercased. Because of this case-sensitivity mismatch, a policy designed to block requests containing specific header values fails open: the rule is evaluated as a non-match, and

❗ Important

✂ PR body was truncated to here.

[ospk8s-renovate]

ℹ️ Artifact update notice

File name: go.mod

In order to perform the update(s) described in the table above, Renovate ran the go get command, which resulted in the following additional change(s):

• 13 additional dependencies were updated

Details:

Package	Change
cel.dev/expr	v0.19.1 -> v0.25.2
github.com/antlr4-go/antlr/v4	v4.13.0 -> v4.13.1
github.com/grpc-ecosystem/grpc-gateway/v2	v2.24.0 -> v2.29.0
go.opentelemetry.io/contrib/instrumentation/net/http/otelhttp	v0.58.0 -> v0.61.0
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/metric	v1.41.0 -> v1.45.0
go.opentelemetry.io/otel/trace	v1.41.0 -> v1.45.0
go.opentelemetry.io/proto/otlp	v1.4.0 -> v1.11.0
golang.org/x/net	v0.56.0 -> v0.58.0
golang.org/x/oauth2	v0.30.0 -> v0.36.0
golang.org/x/tools	v0.47.0 -> v0.49.0
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/api	v0.0.0-20250106144421-5f5ef82da422 -> v0.0.0-20260803160001-6ac0973c030d
google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc	v0.0.0-20250115164207-1a7da9e5054f -> v0.0.0-20260803160001-6ac0973c030d
google.golang.org/protobuf	v1.36.7 -> v1.36.11

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Hi @ospk8s-renovate[bot]. Thanks for your PR.

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