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`redact_secret_like_values` walked one level of a mapping, so a credential one
level deeper came back in clear:
redact_secret_like_values({"headers": {"api_key": "secret"}})
# -> {"headers": {"api_key": "secret"}}
Four operator-written JSON columns pass through it on the way to an API
response — `provider_credentials.client_args`,
`search_tool_credentials.options`, `organization_guardrails.validate_kwargs`
and `guardrail_credentials.validate_kwargs` — and none of them constrains its
shape, so a nested object is allowed in each (mozilla-ai#1125).
Both walkers recurse now, and they had to move together. `restore_redacted_values`
turns a resubmitted mask back into the stored value; left at one level while
the masking reached deeper, the next PATCH would write `***` into the database
where a credential used to be. That is worse than the leak it was fixing, so
the round trip is asserted per shape rather than the masking alone.
Three rules worth stating because they are decisions, not mechanics:
- A matching key masks its value WHOLE, dict or list included. That is what a
matching top-level key has always done to a non-scalar, so depth 0 behaves
exactly as before and the key name stays the only signal.
- Lists are walked, but a bare element is never masked: an element has no key
name to match on, so masking it would be a guess about its value. `restore`
leans on that — a `***` element came from the caller and means itself.
- Past a depth bound the subtree is masked rather than walked. The alternatives
were a RecursionError turning a read into a 500, or a depth the masking never
reaches; between "unreadable" and "leaked" this picks unreadable.
A resized list is treated as a rewrite rather than paired off by index, so a
stored credential is never spliced into a position that no longer means the
same thing.
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 2 included reviews per hour; 1 remains after this review. WalkthroughThe secret-field helpers recursively redact nested dictionaries and lists. Restoration matches nested values and pairs list entries using redacted content or shared unchanged fields. Unmatched and ambiguous entries keep the submitted mask. ChangesSecret field recursion
Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~25 minutes Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to Nested credentials in free-form settings are now masked in responses. They are also preserved when a PATCH echoes the masked values back. Reordering list entries no longer moves one entry's credential onto another; entries that cannot be matched safely keep the mask instead of guessing. No blocking risk remains. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
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In `@src/gateway/models/secret_fields.py`:
- Around line 79-80: Update _restore_node so depth-generated REDACTED_VALUE list
elements are restored from the stored incoming value before the depth-limit
early return, preserving unchanged read-and-PATCH round trips at the boundary;
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The depth bound is the only thing that masks a BARE list element — nothing else does, because an element has no key name to match on. The restore walk pairs a mask with its stored value by key, so such an element had no way back: an unchanged read-and-PATCH round trip wrote *** over the stored credential. The window is one level wide. A list one below the bound has its elements masked individually and hits this; a list at the bound is masked whole as its parent's value and comes back through the existing key pairing. The regression test covers all three depths around it.
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tests/unit/test_secret_fields.py (1)
24-24: 📐 Maintainability & Code Quality | 🔵 TrivialRun the required lint command.
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In `@tests/unit/test_secret_fields.py`:
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The bound's restore branch handed back the stored value whenever the caller echoed `***`. Where nothing is stored underneath, that value is None, so a mask the caller sent at exactly `_MAX_NESTING_DEPTH` came back as null and an unchanged save wrote null over what had been submitted. The shallow branch already answers this the other way: a mask on a key that is not stored is taken literally, because dropping the caller's entry is worse than keeping a placeholder it can clear. The bound now gives the same answer, and it still restores the one thing it was added for, a bare list element the bound itself masked. Also removes the em dashes this branch introduced into the two files. The prose-style rule in `.github/skills/review/SKILL.md` covers doc comments, and the base version of both files had none.
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🟠 Major · Do not restore equal-length lists by position. · src/gateway/models/secret_fields.py:104-105
104-105: 🗄️ Data Integrity & Integration | 🟠 Major | 🏗️ Heavy liftDo not restore equal-length lists by position.
PATCH /provider-credentials/{instance}accepts arbitrary nested JSON and persistsrestore_redacted_values()output._restore_node()restores equal-length lists by index. If a client reorders two objects from the redacted response, each nested***receives the credential from the old index. The update then stores credentials under the wrong objects. The organization provider-key update has the same path.Require stable item identity before restoring masked fields. Reject updates with ambiguous list identity, or treat them as explicit rewrites without restoration. Do not guess by index. Add a test for same-length list reordering.
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Outside diff comments:
In `@src/gateway/models/secret_fields.py`:
- Around line 104-105: Update _restore_node and the restore_redacted_values flow
so equal-length lists are never restored by positional index; require a stable
item identity to match nested masked fields, and reject ambiguous matches or
treat them as explicit rewrites without restoration. Apply the same behavior to
organization provider-key updates and add coverage for reordering same-length
object lists.
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missing-template
| # Positional, and only when the shapes still line up: a list the caller | ||
| # resized is a rewrite, and pairing it off by index would splice stored | ||
| # values into positions that no longer mean the same thing. | ||
| if isinstance(stored, list) and len(stored) == len(incoming): |
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Ran secret_fields.py from this PR's head (74fed3ae) in a clean container. _restore_node's list branch pairs same-length lists by index, and that breaks when the two objects at a position swap: the caller reorders a list of named entries in the dashboard without touching the (still-masked) credential fields, and the restore hands each position the stored value that used to live there, not the one that belongs to the entry now sitting there.
stored = {"extra_headers": [{"name": "x", "token": "live-a"}, {"name": "y", "token": "live-b"}]}
echoed = redact_secret_like_values(stored)
# user reorders the two entries, doesn't touch the masked token fields
submitted = {"extra_headers": [{"name": "y", "token": "***"}, {"name": "x", "token": "***"}]}
restore_redacted_values(submitted, stored)
# {'extra_headers': [{'name': 'y', 'token': 'live-a'}, {'name': 'x', 'token': 'live-b'}]}
# 'y' now carries 'x''s tokenThe resize guard a few lines up (len(stored) == len(incoming)) is there for exactly this splicing risk, but it only catches a length change, not a same-length reorder, so this path is unguarded.
Not sure what the right general fix is without knowing what identifies a list element elsewhere in the codebase, but one option: when list elements are dicts, match stored entries to incoming ones by their non-secret fields before restoring the masked ones, and fall back to list(incoming) (no restore) if no unambiguous match exists.
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Confirmed with your snippet at 74fed3ae: after the reorder, y came back with live-a. Fixed in 691a627, along the lines you suggested.
A list element is now paired with the stored element it is: the one whose masked form it equals. That's exactly what an entry the caller didn't edit looks like, wherever it moved, so your reorder restores y → live-b, x → live-a. The same rule handles resizes better than the old length guard: appending or dropping an entry keeps the credentials of the entries left untouched, where before any length change put the mask over all of them.
Anything that can't be identified keeps the mask as submitted, never a guess:
- entries that mask to the same thing but hold different values (two
{"name": "x", "token": …}with different tokens, or the old[{"token": …}, {"token": …}]case); - an edited entry when another entry moved;
- two or more edited entries, since nothing then shows whether they also moved.
I kept one narrow exception, because "change one visible field and save" is the flow this restore exists for: an edited entry keeps its credential when it is the only unmatched entry, the only unclaimed stored entry sits at the same index, and the list kept its length. Bare elements are masked only at the depth bound and have no content to match on, so they stay positional.
TestListElementIdentity covers the reorder, append, drop, in-place edit, edited-and-moved, two edited, and duplicates. Six of the seven fail at 74fed3ae; the in-place edit passes there and is kept as a guard. Each condition is mutation-checked: removing the in-place exception, its same-index check, or the equal-duplicates check fails the matching test. I renamed test_a_resized_list_is_a_rewrite_and_not_paired_off_by_index to test_entries_that_mask_to_the_same_thing_are_not_guessed_between, since resizing no longer means rewrite; the body is unchanged and still passes.
make lint, make typecheck and the unit suite pass. That includes a mypy arg-type error the depth-bound test already had at 74fed3ae, now silenced like the line above it.
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Ran 691a627 in a clean container. The swap case is fixed, and so is a single in-place edit, but editing the non-secret field on two entries at once, in place with no reorder, loses both credentials instead of one:
stored: [{"name":"a","token":"secretA","label":"old-a"}, {"name":"b","token":"secretB","label":"old-b"}]
incoming: [{"name":"a","token":"***","label":"new-a"}, {"name":"b","token":"***","label":"new-b"}]
restored: [{"name":"a","token":"***","label":"new-a"}, {"name":"b","token":"***","label":"new-b"}]
Both tokens come back "***". The old positional code (74fed3ae) handled this case correctly, since it never needed content matching for a same-length, non-reordered list.
The cause looks like the len(unmatched) == 1 check in _restore_list: two edited entries land in unmatched together, so neither gets the in-place-edit fallback, and both fall through to _restore_node(item, None, depth + 1), which returns their masked fields as the literal string. Generalizing that check to set equality (same_length and unclaimed == set(unmatched), pairing each unmatched index with itself) looks like it would cover this without weakening the ambiguous case, but I have not verified that beyond this one repro.
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I reproduced it at 691a627: both tokens came back as ***. Fixed in 35fcc43.
I didn't use the set-equality version, because relabeling both entries and swapping them in the same save meets the same condition (unmatched and unclaimed are both {0, 1}). Pairing by index then crosses the tokens, which is the swap this thread started from. With your example swapped, b gets secretA.
So an edited entry is now paired by the fields the caller left alone. It goes to the stored entry it shares the most unchanged non-secret fields with, and only when each is the other's single best match. In your example name identifies both entries, so both tokens come back, with or without a reorder. The mask stays when nothing identifies an entry:
- a tie, e.g. a field every entry shares, like
scheme: bearer; - an entry whose visible fields all changed;
- duplicates.
The mutual check means one stored credential never goes to two entries.
New cells in TestListElementIdentity:
- your in-place edit;
- the same edit with a swap;
- a shared-field tie;
- two edited entries both closest to one stored entry.
Three of them fail at 691a627. The tie cell passes there and is kept as a guard.
Each of these five mutations fails at least one cell:
- dropping the mutual check;
- letting a tie pick the first candidate;
- letting a zero score pair;
- counting secret fields in the score;
- index pairing on set equality.
make lint, make typecheck and tests/unit pass (3226 passed).
…its position Restoring masked values inside a list paired elements by index, so reordering two entries handed each the credential of whatever used to sit at its position. Identify an element by content instead: it is the stored element whose masked form it equals, which is what an entry the caller did not edit looks like wherever it moved. Appending or dropping an entry now keeps the credentials of the entries left as they were. An edited entry matches nothing. It keeps its stored credential only when it is the single unmatched entry, the single unclaimed stored entry is at the same index and the length is unchanged, i.e. an in-place edit. Anything less certain, and entries that mask to the same thing but hold different values, keep the mask as submitted instead of guessing. Bare elements, masked only at the depth bound, stay positional. Also silence the arg-type error mypy reports on the depth-bound test, the same way the line above it already does.
Relabeling two entries in place lost both credentials. With more than one edited entry nothing was paired, so both kept the mask, where the old index pairing had restored them. An edited entry still carries the fields the caller left alone. Each one is now paired with the stored entry it shares the most of them with, when each is the other's only best match. That also holds when the edited entries moved, where pairing them by index would cross their credentials. A tie, an entry that shares no unchanged field, and duplicates keep the mask as before, and the mutual check means one stored credential never goes to two entries.
Restoring a list paired edited entries with stored ones by scoring the fields they kept. Entries that differ only in their secret masked to the same thing and could not be told apart, so an unchanged load-and-save wrote *** over every credential in the list. An unchanged list now comes back as stored, an untouched entry is still found by content wherever it moved, and an edited entry that still holds the mask is refused with a 400 instead of being paired by guess.
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Pushed two commits: a merge of main (the branch was 432 behind; no conflicts) and e1c679a, which simplifies how lists are restored.
Why: at 35fcc434, saving an unchanged list wiped its credentials when the entries differed only in their secret, e.g. [{"token": "A"}, {"token": "B"}] → GET → PATCH stored *** twice. That is the failure the PR set out to prevent, and the list-matching heuristic was growing one rule per review round.
Now: an unchanged list comes back as stored; an untouched entry is still found by content wherever it moved; an edited entry that still holds *** gets a 400 (UnresolvedRedactionError) asking for its credential, rather than a guess. Nested dicts are unchanged. For prior art: LiteLLM's SensitiveDataMasker masks recursively but never restores, and Portkey/Pydantic AI Gateway keep keys out of free-form config, so nobody pairs list entries.
Added an integration test through /provider-credentials. Unit suite, make lint and the provider-credentials, org-provider-key, guardrail and search-tool integration tests pass locally. @L4XB, does the 400 trade-off work for you?
Review and commit by Claude Code (Opus 5.5) on behalf of @daavoo.
| if matches and all(stored[pos] == stored[matches[0]] for pos in matches): | ||
| out.append(stored[matches[0]]) | ||
| elif _carries_mask(item, depth + 1): | ||
| raise UnresolvedRedactionError |
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The trade-off to look at: an edited entry with its secret still masked is refused instead of matched. Lists of credential objects are rare in these columns, so re-entering the secret seemed better than the scoring rules it replaces, which could still store *** or cross two tokens.
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Description
A credential written one level down in any of the four free-form settings columns was returned to the API in clear. The masking that keeps
aws_secret_access_keyout of aGET /api/v1/provider-credentialsresponse only looked at the top level of the object, so this came back untouched:{"headers": {"api_key": "secret"}}Anyone who could read that row got the key. All four columns are operator-written and none constrains its shape, so a nested object is allowed in each.
Both halves of the mask now walk nested objects and lists. The second half is the reason this is one change and not two:
restore_redacted_valuesturns a resubmitted***back into the stored value, and if it had stayed at one level while the masking went deeper, the next PATCH from the dashboard would have written***into the database on top of a live credential. Worse than the leak it was fixing — so the round trip is asserted per shape, not the masking alone.Three rules that are decisions rather than mechanics:
{"credentials": {...}}comes back as{"credentials": "***"}.restoreleans on that: a***element came from the caller and means itself.RecursionErrorturning a read into a 500, or a depth the masking never reaches. Between "unreadable" and "leaked" this picks unreadable.A resized list is treated as a rewrite rather than paired off by index, so a stored credential is never spliced into a position that no longer means the same thing.
The issue asked whether a nested match should mask the whole subtree — the first rule above is my answer, and it is the one that needs no new concept: it is the existing behaviour, read at depth.
How to test it locally
23 pass. 13 are new, in two classes:
TestNestedRedaction— the reported leak, a credential inside a list of objects, a matching key masking its subtree, the bare-***-in-a-list invariant, and 40 levels of nesting masked rather than walked forever.TestNestedRoundTrip— the half that makes the first half safe. A nested credential survives an edit of its visible sibling; a masked subtree is restored whole; a list round-trips; a resized list is not paired off by index; and two controls, that a real new nested value still replaces the stored one and that a nested entry the caller dropped stays dropped. Without those last two, "restore everything" would pass every other cell while making nested credentials uneditable.Mutation-checked, all five caught:
***over the credential***list elements unmasked on restoreAlready proven by automation, nothing left to eyeball beyond a reviewer's judgement on the three rules above.
PR Type
Relevant issues
Fixes #1125. The gap was raised in review on #1120 and deferred there deliberately; this is that follow-up.
Checklist
tests/unit,tests/integration).make lint,make typecheck,make test).ruff checkon both changed files — clean;scripts/check_architecture.py— no violations.mypy src/gateway/models/secret_fields.py— clean.pytest tests/unit— 3157 passed, 29 failed, and I checked those 29 against a stashed tree: identical failures without my change, intest_router_aggregate,test_mcp_loop_responses,test_deployment_bootstrap,test_usage_cache_tokensand friends. Two more files (test_inline_platform_cost.py,test_s3_file_store.py) fail to collect in my environment on a pydanticInputTokensDetailsfield. Environmental, not this diff — but I would rather show the number than claim a green run I did not get.***), which is the point of the fix and worth calling out for the dashboard.AI Usage
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Summary
This helps prevent nested credentials from appearing in API responses or being replaced by
***during updates.Technical notes