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Update dependency @astrojs/rss to v4.0.19 [SECURITY] - #49

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Update dependency @astrojs/rss to v4.0.19 [SECURITY]#49
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@renovate renovate Bot commented Jul 21, 2026

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Adoption Passing Confidence
@astrojs/rss (source) 4.0.144.0.19 age adoption passing confidence

@​astrojs/rss: XML Injection via Unescaped RSS Feed Fields

CVE-2026-59728 / GHSA-8j5q-mfj2-5q9q

More information

Details

Summary

In @astrojs/rss, the source.title and enclosure.type item fields are interpolated directly into XML template strings without XML-character escaping before being parsed by fast-xml-parser. An attacker who controls these field values can inject arbitrary XML elements into the generated RSS feed.

Details

Two fields in packages/astro-rss/src/index.ts are affected:

source.title
item.source = parser.parse(
  `<source url="${result.source.url}">${result.source.title}</source>`,
).source;

source.title is validated only as z.string(), with no restriction on XML special characters. A value containing </source> followed by arbitrary XML is parsed as real XML elements, merging injected nodes into the RSS item.

enclosure.type
item.enclosure = parser.parse(
  `<enclosure url="${enclosureURL}" length="${result.enclosure.length}" type="${result.enclosure.type}"/>`,
).enclosure;

enclosure.type is also z.string() and is interpolated into an XML attribute without escaping. A value containing " followed by additional XML can break out of the attribute and inject extra elements.

Proof of Concept

source.title injection:

source: {
  url: 'https://legit.example.com',
  title: '</source><item><title>INJECTED</title><link>https://evil.com</link></item><source>',
}
// Result: RSS feed contains an injected <item> element with an evil.com link

enclosure.type injection:

enclosure: {
  url: 'https://example.com/a.mp3',
  length: 0,
  type: 'audio/mpeg" /><link>https://evil.example.com</link><enclosure fake="',
}
// Result: RSS feed contains an injected <link> element

Both injections were confirmed with fast-xml-parser: the injected "link": "https://evil.com" appears in the parsed output.

Impact

An attacker who can control source.title or enclosure.type values (e.g., via a CMS, database, or user-submitted content that populates RSSFeedItem) can inject arbitrary XML into the generated RSS feed. This corrupts feed structure, injects false metadata (e.g., a fake <link> pointing to a malicious URL), and can cause feed readers to misparse or display attacker-controlled content. In SSR mode (output: 'server'), the poisoned feed is served on every request to all subscribers.

Patches

Fixed in @astrojs/rss@4.0.19.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 4.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

withastro/astro (@​astrojs/rss)

v4.0.19

Compare Source

Patch Changes
  • #​17209 fbcfa03 Thanks @​matthewp! - Hardens RSS feed generation by escaping the source and enclosure item fields. These fields are now serialized as structured XML values, ensuring that special characters in values like source.title and enclosure.type are always treated as text rather than markup, consistent with how other feed fields are handled.

v4.0.18

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Patch Changes

v4.0.17

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Patch Changes

v4.0.16

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Patch Changes

v4.0.15

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Patch Changes

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@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-astrojs-rss-vulnerability branch from 0231d57 to 20ddf3f Compare August 26, 2026 15:11
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-astrojs-rss-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 03d5201 to 6c36267 Compare September 7, 2026 20:42
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/npm-astrojs-rss-vulnerability branch from 6c36267 to 7fd0f87 Compare September 10, 2026 19:56
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