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xChk SCITT signed statement: a hash-only COSE_Sign1 over a person-approved agent action, and its offline checker

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xChk SCITT signed statement

4 November 2026. Format 1.

An xChk registry offers a SCITT signed statement for any action record that a verified person approved. The statement is a COSE_Sign1 (RFC 9052) over the record's hash. Anyone may register it in the SCITT transparency service they trust. The registry signs; it does not register, so no log is a dependency of the registry, and no record enters a log unless someone chose to put it there.

The statement is hash only. Its payload is the 32-byte record hash. The record itself, which names the approver, stays in the receipt bundle that the statement points to. A log that holds the statement holds no name, email, photo, command or plate.

Where to get one

Receipt page https://<registry>/receipt.html?h=<record hash> — the SCITT statement button, shown only for approved acts
Statement GET https://<registry>/api/receipt/<record hash>/statement.cose (application/cose; cose-type="cose-sign1"; 409 for a record that is not an approved act)
Receipt bundle (the preimage and its proofs) GET https://<registry>/api/receipt/<record hash>/bundle
Registry keys https://<registry>/.well-known/xchk-keys.json
Key history (9 Nov 2026) https://<registry>/.well-known/xchk-key-log.json — every signing set ever published, chained and pre-committed; KEY-LOG.md, verify_key_log.py

The bytes

COSE_Sign1 with CBOR tag 18, deterministic encoding (RFC 8949 §4.2.1):

18([
  protected: bstr .cbor {
      1: -8,                                   ; alg: EdDSA (Ed25519)
      4: h'<keyId as UTF-8>',                  ; kid: the keyId of the key in xchk-keys.json (16 hex characters)
     15: {                                     ; CWT claims (RFC 9597)
          1: "https://<registry>",             ;   iss
          2: "urn:xchk:record:<record hash>",  ;   sub
          6: <record time, seconds>            ;   iat: the record's own ts, so the bytes are deterministic
        },
    258: -16,                                  ; payload_hash_alg: SHA-256 (COSE hash envelope)
    259: "application/vnd.xchk.action-record+json",   ; preimage_content_type: the canonical record JSON
    260: "https://<registry>/api/receipt/<record hash>/bundle"   ; payload_location
  },
  unprotected: {},                             ; a transparency service adds its receipt here on registration
  payload: h'<record hash, 32 bytes>',
  signature: h'<64-byte Ed25519 signature>'
])

The signature is over Sig_structure = ["Signature1", protected, h'', payload] (RFC 9052 §4.4). The same record always yields the same bytes: iat is the record's time and Ed25519 is deterministic. Registering it twice registers one statement.

The record hash is sha256 over the UTF-8 bytes of the record's canonical JSON (keys sorted, no whitespace), as the bundle's canonicalization field states. The statement is signed with Ed25519 only. Receipts and seals are also signed with ML-DSA-65, but COSE has no registered hybrid of the two yet.

Checking one, with no network

python3 verify_statement.py xchk-scitt-<hash>.cose --keys xchk-keys.json --bundle xchk-receipt-<hash>.json

Standard library only. It uses verify_receipt.py, which must sit beside it. It checks the structure, the protected header, that sub and the payload name the same record, the Ed25519 signature with the key named by kid, and that the key is not revoked. With --bundle it also checks that the payload equals the bundle's recordHash and sha256(canonical(record)), and that the record is an approved act. Without a key it fails; it never passes open. Exit 0 verified, 1 not verified, 2 usage.

verify_statement.py proves the statement only. For the record's own proof (its seal, the Merkle path, the anchors and the person's signed answer), run verify_receipt.py on the bundle:

python3 verify_receipt.py xchk-receipt-<hash>.json --require-approval --keys xchk-keys.json

Using it as evidence elsewhere

A system that refers to an xChk approval, for example an agent action record in another log, should refer to it by the record hash (the statement's payload and sub), not by the hash of the bundle file. The record hash is fixed when the record is sealed; a bundle is re-served and its bytes can differ between fetches.

Reproduced outside xChk

Anton Sokolov, Tyche Institute (Tallinn) reproduced the receipt verification with code of his own on 13 November 2026: the hashes recompute, the signatures check, tampered copies are refused. He is credited here with his agreement. A verifier that only xChk has run proves little; this one has now been run by someone we do not control.

Where this lives

Public copy: https://github.com/minitru/xchk-scitt. Served copies: https://in.xchk.io/verify/SCITT.md, verify_statement.py, verify_receipt.py.

Licence

MIT, as in each file's header.

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