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docs: say that the payer's message and name are untrusted, and where injection is stopped - #42
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…injection is stopped
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A valid DKIM signature proves the bank sent the e-mail, not that the payer's message is harmless. Nothing said so.
usage.mdandllms.txtnow do:message()andcounterName()are handed out as written, plain text, unescaped, so SQL binds them as parameters and templates escape them.The library does not sanitise them itself: it cannot know where the text goes, escaping for HTML does nothing against SQL injection, and a changed message could stop matching an invoice. jsoup's
Cleanerwas considered for it and left out for those reasons (and its own CVE-2022-36033 and CVE-2026-71497).Docs only.