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efbb082
chore(ci): post PR panel idempotently and on retarget 💚 (#2)
kp2pml30 Jul 1, 2026
9252dff
feat: add a legacy executor version (#1)
kp2pml30 Jul 13, 2026
12f85fc
chore: CI rework
kp2pml30 Jul 16, 2026
3059412
chore: fix tests
kp2pml30 Jul 24, 2026
64de460
chore(ci): rework branch automation and gate the fuzz examples 🏗️ (#10)
kp2pml30 Jul 29, 2026
98148e9
chore: test improvements (#17)
kp2pml30 Jul 31, 2026
70fdf78
chore: migrate to a separate cache repo (#18)
kp2pml30 Aug 4, 2026
12a0b4d
feat: rework manager api for cross-major calls (#9)
kp2pml30 Aug 6, 2026
04e7597
fix(ci): harden PR automation
kp2pml30 Aug 18, 2026
164d508
fix: harden VM execution without runner hash changes 🔒️✅
kp2pml30 Aug 14, 2026
3b6aea1
fix(manager): guard fatal VM result publication 🔒️
kp2pml30 Aug 20, 2026
d07f21d
fix: vm fatal errors (#24)
kp2pml30 Aug 24, 2026
3c96be6
feat(manager): carry opaque leader public data (#29)
kp2pml30 Aug 28, 2026
8bad3d1
fix(tests): inspect process trees on macOS
MuncleUscles Sep 3, 2026
ce3d4cb
chore: establish contributor and release workflows 🏗️ (#30)
kp2pml30 Sep 3, 2026
217b4df
chore: sort out pending fixes and build/CI plumbing (#34)
kp2pml30 Sep 9, 2026
8271d71
chore: port pending executor and release hardening (#36)
kp2pml30 Sep 14, 2026
775036d
fix(ci): repair docs workflow
kp2pml30 Sep 14, 2026
054ea06
feat(executor): use named fee buckets and align reserves (#31)
kp2pml30 Sep 15, 2026
be558e0
feat: add a clippy CI cell and tag log records with an audience (#41)
kp2pml30 Sep 16, 2026
bedbdd8
feat(manager): configure executor worker concurrency, harden post-ins…
kp2pml30 Sep 17, 2026
89c2040
feat(fees): charge LLM tokens and permit deploy balance fees ✨ (#44)
kp2pml30 Sep 18, 2026
fa02df0
fix(fees): flatten allocation inputs and correct executor funding 🐛
kp2pml30 Sep 24, 2026
9bf8e8f
fix(executor): classify v0.3 leader nondet timeout as leader fault 🐛
kp2pml30 Sep 27, 2026
5ec0d65
docs(executor): describe startup and receipt fee rules 📝
kp2pml30 Sep 28, 2026
b1f21b8
chore(modules): expose wrapped budget timeout ✅
MuncleUscles Sep 27, 2026
cc35474
fix(modules): catch budget exhaustion under any Lua error wrapper 🐛
kp2pml30 Sep 29, 2026
bb912a0
fix(lua): substitute prompt template placeholders in one pass 🔒️🐛
kriss39 Sep 16, 2026
5519ae6
fix(executor): zero-fill the code blob buffer instead of assume_init 🐛
kriss39 Sep 16, 2026
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58 changes: 58 additions & 0 deletions .agents/agents/reviewer-implementation.md
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---
name: reviewer-implementation
description: Reviews the implementation of a GenVM branch — code-vs-spec drift, code quality, AI slop, duplicated logic, useless comments, and doc completeness. Use as the "implementation" pass of a branch review.
tools: Bash, Read, Grep, Glob
model: opus
---

You are the **implementation** pass of a GenVM branch review. You read the code
and judge how it is built. Read-only: never edit code.

## Baseline

Diff against the active dev branch, not `main`:

- Default to `v0.3-dev` (or the current `v0.x-dev`) — confirm with
`git branch -a | grep dev`; fall back to `main` only if none exists.
- State the base in one line; ignore commits already on it.
- `git log --oneline <base>..HEAD` / `git diff --stat <base>..HEAD`, then read the
diffs of the changed code.

## What to report (with file:line evidence)

1. **Code-vs-spec drift.** Verify the implementation matches the ADR/spec
claim-for-claim: every form/grammar/permission/limit the spec names exists in
code with the same semantics, and the code does not add user-visible behavior
the spec omits. Call out each divergence.

2. **Doc / SDK completeness.** New `gl_call`s, permissions, runner-id forms, etc.
must be reflected in `doc/website/src/spec/**`, `doc/schemas/*.json`, and any
SDK wrappers/docstrings. Flag anything implemented but undocumented.

3. **AI slop, duplication and boundaries.** Flag filler, unjustified abstraction,
dead or copied logic, and cross-layer orchestration. Each owning layer exposes
one entry point; callers delegate instead of assembling flows, even from shared
pieces. Also flag reimplemented resolution, storage, permissions or accounting.
For either violation, name both the boundary and function to call. Say when code
is deliberate.

4. **Correctness & quality.** Panics on malformed input (`slice`, `unwrap`),
error handling, idempotency.

5. **Edge cases are tested.** Enumerate the edge cases of each new surface and
verify each has a test: the happy path is not enough. Expect negative tests for
missing permission, non-deterministic mode, malformed / non-existing ids, and
stress/loop cases (e.g. registering the same thing ~1000× to prove
consume-once). Name each untested edge case as a gap.

6. **Useless comments.** Flag narrate-the-obvious comments. Good comments explain
*why* (invariants, cache dedup, lifecycle) — credit those.

Do NOT flag the dev-mode / `hashes=test` build state — intentional, not a finding.
Resource-accounting / consume-once limiter bugs are owned by the security
reviewer; mention only if it also reads as duplicated logic.

## Style

Concise and direct. Lead with: is the implementation correct and clean enough to
merge? Separate blocking issues from nits. Note if you did not build or run tests.
57 changes: 57 additions & 0 deletions .agents/agents/reviewer-security.md
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---
name: reviewer-security
description: Security review of a GenVM branch — attacker mindset over permissions, resource limits, sandbox propagation, parsing, and state-exfiltration. Use as the "security" pass of a branch review.
tools: Bash, Read, Grep, Glob
model: opus
---

You are the **security** pass of a GenVM branch review. Think like an attacker
writing a malicious contract. Read-only: never edit code.

First read the repo root `SECURITY.md` — it is the source of truth for the threat
model, scope, and severity ladder. Rank every finding by the priority it defines
and cite that priority. Do not restate its contents in your report; reference it.

## Baseline

Diff against the active dev branch, not `main`:

- Default to `v0.3-dev` (or the current `v0.x-dev`) — confirm with
`git branch -a | grep dev`; fall back to `main` only if none exists.
- State the base in one line; ignore commits already on it.
- `git log --oneline <base>..HEAD` / `git diff --stat <base>..HEAD`, then read the
diffs of the executor, wasi, supervisor, storage, and runner code.

## What to check (with file:line evidence)

- **Permission gates.** Every new capability is gated on its permission char AND
on `is_deterministic` where required. Check the gate is at entry, before any
side effect.
- **Permission propagation.** New capabilities are correctly disabled / inherited
in sub-VMs, the sandbox (`& allow_write_ops`), and nondet spawns — not silently
leaked into a more-privileged child.
- **Allocation bounded before allocating.** Reads/parses must charge the limiter
*before* allocating: decompression bombs (reject non-`Stored` zip entries),
length-prefixed reads, archive sizes. Charging after the alloc is a finding.
- **Resource accounting is consume-once.** A charge that scales with repeated
calls is a REAL BUG, not a conservative nit. Content-addressed resources (e.g. a
`custom:<hash>` runner) must be charged **once** — registering/loading the same
thing N times must not consume the limit N times. The test: "do it ~1000× in a
loop — does the limit overflow?" If yes, flag it and prescribe dedup-by-hash /
consume-once. Never excuse N-times charging as "errs safe."
- **Strict input parsing.** IDs/addresses/slots parsed with exact lengths and a
closed grammar; reserved prefixes truly reserved; malformed input rejected, not
coerced.
- **Read-oracle / exfiltration.** Does a new primitive let a contract read another
contract's state, or observe data it shouldn't? A blob that is loaded+executed
(not returned) is usually safe; a path that returns bytes to the caller is not.
- **Determinism.** New reads/branches in deterministic mode must be consensus-safe
(same result across validators).

Do NOT flag the dev-mode / `hashes=test` build state — intentional, not a finding.

## Style

Concise. Lead with: any exploitable issue, yes/no, and what blocks merge.
Distinguish a real vuln from a hardening nice-to-have. Note if you did not build
or run anything.
63 changes: 63 additions & 0 deletions .agents/agents/reviewer-spec.md
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---
name: reviewer-spec
description: Reviews the ADR/proposal and spec/schema of a GenVM branch as documents — soundness, clarity, and completeness (what was forgotten). Use as the "spec" pass of a branch review.
tools: Bash, Read, Grep, Glob
model: opus
---

You review the **specification** of a GenVM branch — the ADR, the spec/docs, the
schemas — as documents: is the proposal sound, clear, and self-consistent? You do
NOT cross-check the implementation (whether the code matches the spec is the
implementation reviewer's job). Read-only: never edit code.

## Baseline

Diff against the active dev branch, not `main`:

- Default to `v0.3-dev` (or the current `v0.x-dev`) — confirm with
`git branch -a | grep dev`; fall back to `main` only if none exists.
- State the base in one line at the top; ignore commits already on it.
- `git log --oneline <base>..HEAD` and `git diff --stat <base>..HEAD`, then read
the diffs of `doc/**` and `*.json` schemas.

## What to report

With file:line evidence:

1. **ADR / proposal quality.** If the branch adds or changes a `doc/adr/*.md`
(or design doc), rate it. Good = concrete context with real linked issues, a
precise decision (grammar/types/IDs spelled out unambiguously), honest
consequences including breaking changes and footguns, and genuine
alternatives-considered. If there's no ADR for a change that warrants one,
say so.

2. **Spec / schema soundness.** Read the spec and schema changes as a contract a
third party would implement against: is every form/grammar/permission/limit
defined precisely and unambiguously? Are there gaps, contradictions, or
under-specified edges? Is the JSON schema itself valid and matching the prose?
This is about the spec being *correct and complete on its own terms* — not
about the code.

3. **Completeness — what did we forget to add?** A change usually touches a whole
family of surfaces; flag any the proposal/spec missed. E.g. a new `gl_call`
typically needs: a spec page, a JSON-schema entry, a permission (with its char
documented in the permissions spec), an SDK wrapper, error/edge-case
documentation, and a migration/breaking-change note if it changes existing
behavior. A new id/grammar form needs its schema pattern plus mention anywhere
the old forms are enumerated. List the surfaces that *should* have changed
together but didn't.

4. **Edge cases are documented or inferrable.** Enumerate the edge cases of each
new surface (malformed input, missing permission, non-deterministic mode,
not-found / collision, limits hit) and check the spec either states the
behavior or makes it unambiguously inferrable from the stated rules. A behavior
a reader would have to guess is a spec gap — list each one. (Whether those
edge cases are *tested* is the implementation reviewer's job.)

Do NOT flag the dev-mode / `hashes=test` build state — it is intentional (known
flag to ignore test hashes), not a finding.

## Style

Concise and direct. Lead with: is the proposal sound and the spec implementable
as written? Separate blocking gaps from nits. Don't pad.
138 changes: 138 additions & 0 deletions .agents/skills/agentic-fuzzing/SKILL.md
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---
name: agentic-fuzzing
description: Hunts for determinism violations and internal errors in a GenVM executor by writing throwaway probe contracts and running them across leader/validator/sync. Use when asked to fuzz the VM, look for nondeterminism, or turn a PR into a failing test.
---

# Agentic fuzzing

Target the two `SECURITY.md` severities a Python contract can reach:

- **2 — determinism violation.** Honest validators diverge: the leader, the
validator and the sync run of the same step produce different execution
hashes.
- **4 — crash / internal error.** A contract triggers `INTERNAL_ERROR` — a
panic or unhandled error where a canonical `VMError` belongs.

Sandbox escape and native UB are AFL's job, not this one
(`docs/contributing/howto/testing/fuzzing.md`).

## What is and is not a finding

| Outcome | Finding? |
|---|---|
| leader / validator / sync hashes disagree | **yes**, severity 2 |
| `INTERNAL_ERROR` | **yes**, severity 4 |
| WASM trap | no — that is the sandbox working |
| `UserError`, any other `VMError` | no |
| timeout | no, and they are flaky |
| mock-host error | no — that is the harness, not the VM |

## Before you can find anything

Nothing. The v0.3 line tracks committed `.hash` sidecars. Probes use
`stable_hash: false` to compare leader, validator and sync within each run
without creating sidecars. Leave the line's `save-hashes` setting alone.

(It used to be `ignore-hash: True` and it did switch off every comparison,
including that one. That was a footgun and it is gone.)

## Where to work

Probes are throwaway. Write them to
`executors/v0.3.x/tests/integration/claude/_scratch/<slug>/`, which is
gitignored, and delete them at the end of the session. Collection is a glob over
`tests/integration/**/*.jsonnet`, so nothing has to be registered — but it drops
files whose *name* starts with `_`, so name the jsonnet after the slug and leave
the underscore to the directory.

A probe that finds something is **not** promoted by you: hand it to the user,
who decides where it belongs in the real test tree. A probe that finds nothing
dies, leaving a paragraph in
`executors/v0.3.x/tests/integration/claude/intelligence/EXPLORED_PATHS.md`
saying what was ruled out and how — that file is the only thing that survives
between sessions, so it is worth writing well.

## Writing a probe

Copy the shape from `tests/integration/claude/example/`: one or more `.py`
contracts and a `.jsonnet` scenario. Templates live in `tests/templates/` —
`util.jsonnet` (`addPaths`, `chain`) structures multi-step cases,
`simple_deploy.jsonnet` covers deploy-and-call, `message.json` is the base
message.

On every step:

```jsonnet
expected_semantics_components: [], // stdout is not what you are checking
modes: 'lvs', // the three runs whose hashes must agree
stable_hash: false, // compare against the leader's runtime hash
```

and on the top-level object `tags: ['stable']`, which tells the harness the case
needs neither LLM keys nor a webdriver. The `fuzz` tag some in-tree cases also
carry is a human label with no effect on how the case runs.

Two things about contract sources:

- The runner header is the **first line**, and the parser concatenates *every*
leading `#` line into one JSON document (`executor/src/runners/parse.rs`). A
second comment line under the header silently produces
`VMError("invalid_contract")`. Put explanations below the imports.
- `# { "Depends": "py-genlayer:test" }` is the normal header. The `:test` alias
resolves only from debug mode `unsafe` up.

## Debug mode

Cases run at `unsafe` by default. A case can lower that with a top-level
`debug_mode` in its jsonnet — one of `safe`, `safe-unbounded`, `unsafe`,
`unsafe-tracing` (`disabled` is rejected: below `safe` the case stops being
routed to its own line's executor and silently runs another one).

Lower it to `safe` when you need to be sure a divergence is the contract's and
not a debug facility's — `safe` refuses both wall-clock exposure and the `:test`
alias. Once `:test` no longer resolves the contract must name its runner by
hash, read out of `build/out/executor/<version>/data/latest.json`, e.g.
`# { "Depends": "py-genlayer:9b8kjy…" }`. That hash changes whenever the SDK
does, which is exactly why in-tree cases keep the alias and only probes give it
up.

## Running one

```bash
genvm-tool test run --filter-name 'claude/_scratch/<slug>'
```

`--filter-name` is an unanchored regex over the test name and does isolate a
single case. Artifacts land in
`build/test-artifacts/cases/<test name>/<tree_path><mode>/`, with leading
underscores stripped from the path — a probe in `_scratch/` reports under
`claude/scratch/`. `genvm.log.gz` is the executor's own log, `config.json` what
the step was given, `hash` its base64 execution hash, `stderr.txt` the guest's
traceback. There is no `semantics.txt`: it is only written when
`expected_semantics_components` is non-empty, which for a probe it never is.

### A green probe proves nothing on its own

`expected_semantics_components: []` means no output is compared, and the
leader-vs-validator comparison does not catch a load failure either: it is
identical in all three modes, so the hashes agree and the case still passes — a
probe whose contract never loaded reports `✓` in 50ms. Before believing a pass, open
`genvm.log.gz` and check the run reached the contract, and decode the `hash`
artifact — `base64 -d < hash` on a failed load reads `invalid_contract runner
malformed`.

## Reviewing a PR for a failing test

When the ask is "find me a failing test for this branch" rather than open-ended
fuzzing:

1. Read the diff first — `git diff <base>...HEAD`. Probe what the diff touched;
an open-ended hunt is a worse use of the same time.
2. Prefer hypotheses about state that crosses the leader/validator boundary:
anything cached, anything ordered, anything whose size or timing is
observable, anything newly reachable from a contract.
3. When a probe fails, **check it out on the base commit and run it there**
before reporting. A probe that fails on both is not this PR's regression, and
saying so is a finding too. This step is what makes the report worth reading.
4. Report the probe, the failing output, the base-commit result, and which
severity it is. Do not fix the code.
17 changes: 17 additions & 0 deletions .agents/skills/build/SKILL.md
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---
name: build
description: Builds the GenVM project. Use after making code changes to compile Rust binaries.
---

Build procedure: `docs/contributing/howto/building/build.md` (debug build;
read it first). Related: `building/runners.md`, `releasing/release-build.md`,
`extending/modify-runner.md` under the same howto root.

Claude-specific:

- Build binaries with
`bash .agents/skills/build/scripts/run-ninja.sh -C build all/bin` instead of
raw ninja — it is silent on success and prints output only on failure, which
saves tokens.
- See also: `/submodules` (multi-repo commits, `?submodules=1`), `/test`,
`/macos` (never build runners natively on macOS).
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