Security hardening + code quality sweep (9-block audit)#103
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…astructure improvements Backports from production sc-* repos to starter templates: API Starter: - Guest checkout: nullable userId, isGuest/guestEmail/guestPhone fields - Guest order creation with insertOrderWithRetry for collision handling - Guest payment flow (create-order + verify) with email-based ownership - Order tracking endpoint (POST /orders/track) - public, no auth - Manual refund support for admin (COD/UPI orders) - Email templates: order-refunded, admin-order-notification - Notification service with fire-and-forget pattern - Site settings: enableRazorpay, enableCOD, enableSelfPickup, OrderNotifications - APP_CURRENCY config (default INR), APP_URL, STOREFRONT_URL env vars - DB_POOL_SIZE and max_lifetime database config - pageSize alias in pagination response Storefront Starter: - Full guest checkout flow with inline address form - Guest payment via Razorpay with email prefill - Order tracking page (/track-order) - public - optionalAuth for guest cart access (cookie-based guest_cart_id) - SSR_API_URL for Docker internal networking - isDeno guard for browser-safe env access - AbortSignal.timeout on API calls - Contact form proxy route (/api/contact) - Email verification resend (/api/auth/resend-verification + island) - /health endpoint - Dual payment verification (guest + authenticated) Admin UI Starter: - Guest order display: isGuest column, Customer Type filter - Customer info card on order detail (guest vs registered) - Manual refund support - SSR_API_URL for Docker internal networking - DatePicker in GenericForm, textarea/custom FieldType - formatDate helpers in DataTable and ShowPage - canEditRecord and limit in entity config types - Feature flags from backend schemas - /health endpoint - pageSize support in order service READMEs updated across all packages.
- database.ts: promptForCredentials reads PGUSER/PGPASSWORD (was hardcoded postgres:password) - database.ts: createDatabaseWithPassword adds -d postgres to psql args - destroy.ts: dropDatabases reads PGUSER/PGPASSWORD env vars - destroy.ts: dropDatabaseWithPassword adds -d postgres to psql args - cli/cleanup-test-dbs.ts: reads PGUSER/PGPASSWORD, adds -d postgres - api-starter/cleanup-test-db.ts: loads .env.test.local, extracts creds from DATABASE_URL - api-starter/setup-test-full.ts: loads .env.test.local before .env.test - admin/_test_setup.ts: reads PGUSER/PGPASSWORD (was already fixed) - admin/cleanup-test-db.ts: reads PGUSER/PGPASSWORD (was already fixed) - scaffold.test.ts: dropWorkspaceDatabases reads PGUSER/PGPASSWORD, adds -d postgres - api-creator.ts: test-mode credentials read PGUSER/PGPASSWORD env vars Also update README files with test setup docs including troubleshooting tables covering auth failures, missing .env.test.local, and leftover database cleanup commands. All three test suites pass with zero leftover databases after run: cli: 225 passed, 0 failed admin: 83 passed, 0 failed api-starter: 35 passed (601 steps), 0 failed
Closes #98, #99, #101 Partially addresses #52, #71, #89 ## Block 1: P0 Critical Security - Fix SQL injection in destroy.ts + database.ts (quote dbName in DROP/CREATE DATABASE) - Remove JWT fallback secret -- throw if JWT_SECRET unset in production - Add OAuth redirect allowlist + HttpOnly cookie (stop token-in-URL pattern) - Fix GitHub token exposure in workspace.ts -- use GIT_ASKPASS instead of URL embedding - Fix SSH host verification in infra.ts -- replace StrictHostKeyChecking no with ssh-keyscan - Add permissions: contents: read to generated GitHub Actions workflows ## Block 2: Critical + High Impact - Add per-request API client factory in storefront-starter (fix singleton auth leak) - Add rate limiting to all auth routes (10/15min login/register, 5/15min password reset) - Wrap projectStore.ts KV writes in atomic operations - Restrict Dockerfile CMD from --allow-all to granular permission flags - Wrap order and payment service mutations in DB transactions ## Block 3: API Input Validation + Error Handling - Guard all parseInt() calls with NaN checks across controllers - Cap rate limiter Map at 10,000 entries with FIFO eviction - Mask database password in startup log - Add DB_POOL_MAX env var support - Move request ID generation to start of middleware pipeline - Echo X-Request-ID response header from error handler ## Block 4: Admin Package Fixes - checkAuth throws HTTPException(401/403) instead of generic Error - bulkDelete validates each ID is string or number - Cap slug uniqueness loop at 100 iterations in drizzle.ts and slug.ts ## Block 5: CLI Robustness - Track partial workspace creation -- set status partial on any component failure - Fix upgrade.ts swallowing errors -- log details and show hints - Replace Deno.exit() with throw in create.ts and base-creator.ts ## Block 6: Slug Consolidation - article.service.ts imports generateSlug from @tstack/admin (remove private duplicate) - Add JSDoc to all exports in packages/admin/mod.ts ## Block 7: New Tests (+227 CLI, +50 api-starter, +83 admin all passing) - jwt.test.ts -- createToken/verifyToken roundtrip, tampered/garbage rejection - response.test.ts -- ApiResponse success/error/paginated - validation.test.ts -- ValidationUtil + commonSchemas - rateLimit.test.ts -- limits, headers, skip, custom keys, eviction, reset - requireRole.test.ts -- role middleware + all convenience middlewares - requireAuth.test.ts -- full integration through app routes - adminUiDetection.test.ts -- name derivation, suffix stripping, real fs - config.test.ts -- loadConfig/saveConfig/ensureConfig with temp HOME - Delete dead scaffold.test.old.ts ## Block 8: UI Improvements - Add _error.tsx to storefront-starter and admin-ui-starter (404/500 handling) - Add data-testid attributes to login, register, cart, add-to-cart, admin login - Fix ContactForm.tsx -- rename FormData interface, replace unsafe as string casts - Remove no-op try/catch blocks in validate.ts middleware ## Block 9: Infrastructure + Docs - Pin all dependency versions (remove ^ caret ranges) across all 5 deno.json files - Document exact test flags and required env vars in AGENTS.md - Add terminal output policy to copilot-instructions.md (no tail/head truncation)
…99 #100 #101) - ci.yml: add 'permissions: contents: read' (least-privilege, was missing from actual workflow) - api-starter database.ts: expose DB_IDLE_TIMEOUT, DB_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, DB_MAX_LIFETIME as env vars with same defaults (20s, 10s, 1800s); DB_POOL_SIZE was already env-configurable - docs/environment-variables.md: document all four DB pool config variables - Remaining audit items consolidated into #102
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Pull request overview
This PR implements a comprehensive security hardening and code quality sweep addressing issues #52, #71, #84, and #89. The changes span 9 blocks covering critical security fixes, authentication improvements, input validation, test coverage expansion, and infrastructure hardening.
Changes:
- Security fixes: SQL injection prevention, JWT secret enforcement, OAuth redirect validation, SSH key verification
- Authentication: Per-request API clients, rate limiting, atomic KV operations, guest checkout support
- Code quality: 100+ new tests (360+ total), dependency pinning, error handling improvements, data-testid attributes
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 129 out of 129 changed files in this pull request and generated 2 comments.
Show a summary per file
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| packages/storefront-starter/vite.config.ts | Added CORS wildcard configuration for dev server |
| packages/storefront-starter/utils.ts | Added per-request API client to state |
| packages/storefront-starter/routes/track-order.tsx | New guest order tracking page |
| packages/storefront-starter/routes/api/contact.ts | New server-side contact form proxy |
| packages/storefront-starter/routes/_middleware.ts | Enhanced with per-request API client and guest support |
| packages/storefront-starter/lib/api.ts | Added guest checkout methods and per-request client factory |
| packages/cli/src/utils/database.ts | Fixed SQL injection with parameterized queries |
| packages/cli/src/utils/projectStore.ts | Added atomic KV commits |
| packages/cli/src/commands/workspace.ts | Improved Git token security and workspace status handling |
| packages/cli/src/commands/infra.ts | Fixed SSH host key verification |
| packages/api-starter/src/shared/utils/jwt.ts | JWT secret validation and fallback removal |
| packages/api-starter/src/config/database.ts | Added configurable DB pool settings |
| packages/api-starter/src/shared/middleware/rateLimit.ts | Added FIFO eviction cap |
| packages/api-starter/src/shared/middleware/logger.ts | Added request ID generation |
| packages/api-starter/src/auth/oauth.controller.ts | OAuth redirect allowlist and HttpOnly cookies |
| packages/api-starter/Dockerfile | Replaced --allow-all with granular permissions |
| packages/admin/src/framework/hono.ts | checkAuth now returns proper HTTP exceptions |
| packages/admin/src/core/slug.ts | Added max attempts cap on slug generation |
| All deno.json files | Pinned all dependency versions |
| const body = await ctx.req.json(); | ||
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| const response = await fetch(`${SSR_API_URL}/contact`, { | ||
| method: "POST", | ||
| headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" }, | ||
| body: JSON.stringify(body), | ||
| }); |
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The contact form proxy forwards user input to the backend without any validation or rate limiting. This could be abused for spamming or as a CSRF vector. Consider adding:
- Rate limiting on this endpoint
- CSRF token validation
- Basic input validation (e.g., check for required fields before proxying)
| server: { | ||
| cors: { | ||
| origin: "*", | ||
| }, | ||
| }, |
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The wildcard CORS configuration in vite.config.ts (origin: "*") is a security concern. In production, the Vite dev server shouldn't be exposed, but during development this allows any website to make requests to your local dev server. Consider using origin: ["http://localhost:8000", "http://localhost:3000"] or documenting that this file should not be used in production.
- payment.service.ts: explicit PaymentDetails type annotation, narrow webhookEvent.orderId/payment before use in transactions (fixes TS7034, TS7005, TS18048, TS2769 errors) - routes/api/contact.ts: add server-side rate limiting (5/min per IP) and input validation (email + message required) per Copilot review - vite.config.ts: replace wildcard CORS origin with explicit localhost origins (dev-only, never used in production) per Copilot review
Summary
Comprehensive security hardening and code quality sweep across all packages.
Squash and merge — keeps a single revert target if anything breaks.
Closes #52, #71, #84, #89.
Remaining items tracked in #102.
Changes by block
Block 1 — Critical security
Block 2 — Auth & concurrency
Block 3 — Input validation & observability
Block 4 — HTTP error semantics
Block 5 — CLI reliability
Block 6 — Admin integration
Block 7 — Test coverage
Block 8 — Code quality
Block 9 — Docs & infrastructure
Testing
All tests pass:
deno task testin cli (227), admin (83), api-starter (50)fmt + lint clean: 524 / 464 files