LNXDrive is in alpha. Only the most recent alpha release receives security fixes; there are no backports.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.0-alpha.x (latest) | ✅ |
| anything older | ❌ |
Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
- Preferred: use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting — Security → Report a vulnerability.
- Alternatively, email contact@strangedays.tech with subject
[SECURITY] lnxdrive: <short summary>.
Include: affected component (daemon / FUSE / CLI / GNOME panel / packaging), reproduction steps, impact assessment, and your environment (distro, GNOME version, install method).
- Acknowledgement within 7 days.
- Coordinated disclosure: we ask for up to 90 days to ship a fix before public disclosure. Single-maintainer project — complex fixes may need the full window.
- Credit in the release notes (opt-out if you prefer anonymity).
Documented threat analysis lives in the repository's governance tree
(.straymark/02-design/risk-analysis/ and .straymark/08-security/).
Highlights relevant to users:
- OAuth tokens never touch disk in cleartext and never travel raw over D-Bus: they live in the system keyring (Secret Service); the D-Bus API exposes only opaque session handles.
- The Flatpak sandbox uses scoped D-Bus names (no unrestricted
--socket=session-bus). - The config parser is hardened against YAML expansion attacks (billion-laughs caps).
- CI runs
cargo auditandcargo denyon every change to the engine.
Known limitations of the alpha (host-side components outside the Flatpak sandbox, FUSE device access) are documented in the release notes of each pre-release.